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Prof. Dr. Patrick Schmitz

Prof. Dr. Patrick Schmitz - Department of Economics

Research focuses

Contract theory, theory of economic incentives, incomplete contracts, asymmetric information, property rights

Curriculum Vitae

  • 2015  Hans-Kelsen-Prize, University of Cologne
  • 2015  One of the 15 most productive German economists according to the  Handelsblatt Lifetime Achievement Ranking
  • 2007  Member of the "Young Elite" selected by the business paper Capital
  • Since 2006 Professor of Economics, University of Cologne
  • 2006 Karl-Arnold-Prize, NRW Akademie der Wissenschaften
  • Since 2005 Research Fellow, Industrial Organization Programme, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London
  • 2004 Habilitation (Venia Legendi in Economics), University of Bonn 
  • 1999 Dr. rer. pol. (Ph.D. in Economics), University of Bonn
  • 1994 Diplom-Volkswirt (Master in Economics), University of Bonn

Selected Publications

  • Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: An experimental study (with Eva Hoppe), Review of Economic Studies 80, 2013, 1516-1544.
  • Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (with Eva Hoppe), RAND Journal of Economics 44, 2013, 56-74.
  • Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence (with Eva Hoppe), Games and Economic Behavior 73, 2011, 186-199.
  • Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks (with Eva Hoppe), Journal of Public Economics 94, 2010, 258-268.
  • Reserve prices in auctions as reference points (with Stephanie Rosenkranz), Economic Journal 117, 2007, 637-653.
  • Information gathering, transaction costs, and the property rights approach, American Economic Review 96, 2006, 422-434.
  • Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 2005, 318-336.
  • On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information, Journal of Economic Theory 106, 2002, 177-189.
  • On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems, Journal of Economic Theory 103, 2002, 444-460.
  • Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante safety regulation: Substitutes or complements? Comment (with Christian Ewerhart), American Economic Review 88, 1998, 1027.