Prof. Dr. Patrick Schmitz
Contract theory, theory of economic incentives, incomplete contracts, asymmetric information, property rights
- 2015 Hans-Kelsen-Prize, University of Cologne
- 2015 One of the 15 most productive German economists according to the Handelsblatt Lifetime Achievement Ranking
- 2007 Member of the "Young Elite" selected by the business paper Capital
- Since 2006 Professor of Economics, University of Cologne
- 2006 Karl-Arnold-Prize, NRW Akademie der Wissenschaften
- Since 2005 Research Fellow, Industrial Organization Programme, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London
- 2004 Habilitation (Venia Legendi in Economics), University of Bonn
- 1999 Dr. rer. pol. (Ph.D. in Economics), University of Bonn
- 1994 Diplom-Volkswirt (Master in Economics), University of Bonn
- Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: An experimental study (with Eva Hoppe), Review of Economic Studies 80, 2013, 1516-1544.
- Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (with Eva Hoppe), RAND Journal of Economics 44, 2013, 56-74.
- Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence (with Eva Hoppe), Games and Economic Behavior 73, 2011, 186-199.
- Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks (with Eva Hoppe), Journal of Public Economics 94, 2010, 258-268.
- Reserve prices in auctions as reference points (with Stephanie Rosenkranz), Economic Journal 117, 2007, 637-653.
- Information gathering, transaction costs, and the property rights approach, American Economic Review 96, 2006, 422-434.
- Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 2005, 318-336.
- On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information, Journal of Economic Theory 106, 2002, 177-189.
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems, Journal of Economic Theory 103, 2002, 444-460.
- Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante safety regulation: Substitutes or complements? Comment (with Christian Ewerhart), American Economic Review 88, 1998, 1027.