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Prof. Dr. Felix Bierbrauer

Prof. Dr. Felix Bierbrauer - Chair for Public Economics

Research focuses

Optimal Taxation, Public Goods, Political Economy, Economic Theory

Curriculum Vitae

  • Since 2011 Professor, Chair for Public Economics and Center for Macroeconomic Research, University of Cologne, Germany
  • 2010 - 2011 Visiting Professor, University of Mannheim, Germany
  • 2006 - 2011 Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
  • 2006 - 2007 Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA
  • 2004 - 2006 Research assistant, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
  • 2002 - 2004 Research and teaching assistant for Professor Martin Hellwig, University of Mannheim, Germany
  • 2006 Dissertation, University of Mannheim. Title: Essays on Public Goods Provision and Income Taxation“, 
  • 2002 - 2006 Doctoral student, Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics, University of Mannheim
  • 2002 Diploma in Economics, University of Mannheim
  • 1997 - 2002 Studies in economics at the universities of Saarbrücken, Mannheim, and Tilburg (Netherlands)

Selected Publications

  • Mechanism Design and Intentions, with Nick Netzer, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.
  • Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa, with Martin Hellwig, forthcoming, Review of Economic Studies.
  • Efficiency, Welfare and Political Competition, with Pierre Boyer, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131, pp. 461-518,2016.
  • Tax incidence for fragile financial markets, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 120, pp. 107-125, 2014.
  • The Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation, with Pierre Boyer, Annals of Economics and Statistics, vol. 113/114, pp. 185-206, 2014.
  • Optimal tax and expenditure policy with aggregate uncertainty, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 6, pp. 205-257, 2014.
  • Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility, with Craig Brett and John A. Weymark, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 82, pp. 292-311, 2013.
  • Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass, with Pierre Boyer, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 103, pp 1-14 (lead article), 2013.
  • Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem, International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 19, pp. 732-752, 2012.
  • On the optimality of optimal income taxation, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 146, pp. 2105-2116, 2011.
  • Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95, pp. 553-569, 2011.
  • Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public-good provision, with Marco Sahm, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 94, pp. 453-466, 2010.
  • A Note on Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, pp. 667-670, 2009.
  • Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 311-342, 2009.